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AbstrAct Justice for children meets specific obstacles when it comes 
to its realization due not only to the nature of rights and the peculiarities 
of children as subjects of rights. The conflict of interests between short-
term and long-term aims, and the different interpretations a state can do 
on the question concerning how to materialize social rights policies and 
how to interpret its commitments on social justice play also a role. Starting 
by the question on why the affluent states do not seem to be motivated 
enough to fully assume those duties of justice toward children —derived 
form recognizing children’s rights—, this article aims to explore and shed 
light on what psychology of motivation and moral psychology, and positive 
approaches could offer in relation to political and ethical challenges 
toward childhood. Hence this article advocates for the modification and 
enrichment of the philosophical discourse on children’s rights with what 
psychology has proved to have a more efficient impact in agents’ action and 
motivation. In doing so, practical philosophy could improve its role helping 
understand and eventually surpassing some akratic tendencies in the public 
sphere with respect to children’s rights.
Key words akrasia; children’s rights; moral psychology; justice; 
motivation.
resumen La realización de la justicia para la infancia se encuentra con 
obstáculos específicos, no sólo debido a la naturaleza de los derechos y a 
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las peculiaridades de la infancia como sujeto de derechos, sino también al 
conflicto de intereses entre objetivos a corto y largo plazo y las diferentes 
interpretaciones que un Estado puede hacer cuando trata con cuestiones 
sobre cómo materializar políticas de derechos sociales y cómo cumplir 
sus compromisos con la justicia social. Empezando por la cuestión sobre 
por qué los estados ricos no parecen estar suficientemente motivados para 
asumir de manera completa aquellos deberes de justicia hacia la infancia, 
derivados del reconocimiento de los derechos de esta, este artículo sugiere 
prestar atención a qué podría aportar la psicología de la motivación 
y la psicología moral en relación a los retos éticos y políticos actuales 
concernientes a la infancia. Así, se propone modificar y enriquecer el 
discurso filosófico con aquellos estrategias que desde las disciplinas citadas 
parecen tener un impacto más eficiente en la motivación de los agentes. 
Al hacer esto, la filosofía práctica se beneficiaría del intercambio entre 
disciplinas mejorando su papel a la hora de ayudar a entender y superar 
algunas tendencias acráticas.
pAlAbrAs clAve acrasia; derechos de la infancia; motivación; justicia; 
psicología moral.
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Justice and Children´s Rights: The Role of Moral Psychology in the Practical Philosophy Discourse
Throughout this article I will make two general assumptions that should be clarified as the starting points. Firstly, I assume that children are subjects 
of rights, and that they indeed are rights-holders. Secondly, I assume that 
rights and justice are two faces of the same coin (Nussbaum, 2006). 
With respect to the first assumption, I will not discuss here why 
children have rights. I will not go into the discussion about the justification 
of human rights and children´s rights. In doing so, I avoid the debate on 
moral dignity, anthropological dignity, eurocentrism and, in turn, the 
accusations that normally come out from both sides of the debate such as 
speciesism, the naturalistic fallacy, the genetic fallacy, moral relativism, 
etc. Likewise, I avoid making specific ontological assumptions that could 
scarcely be shareable. 
On the contrary, as a matter of pragmatism, I take as sufficient for my 
goal here the fact that rights are recognized in international conventions, 
regardless why we have come to those international agreements.
There is also a wide discussion on the basic rights that can be 
attributed to children. However, here I will assume that children are right-
holders of those universal rights —such as education, health, household, 
physical integrity, etc.— captured in the United Nation Convention on the 
Rights of the Child in 1989. As a result, a deeper analysis regarding the rich 
debate on which ones should be prioritized and parental rights would be out 
of the scope of this article.
Although the state is definitely not the only agent of justice (O’Neill, 
2001) that has the responsibility to protect children’s rights, my analysis in 
what follows takes as a starting point the fact that:
States Parties shall undertake all appropriate legislative, 
administrative, and other measures for the implementation of 
the rights recognized in the present Convention. With regard to 
economic, social and cultural rights, States Parties shall undertake 
such measures to the maximum extent of their available resources 
and, where needed, within the framework of international co-
operation. (United Nations General Assembly, 1989, art. 4)
With respect to the second assumption, I take for granted that a 
society would be much more just if its population´s rights were respected, 
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not violated, protected and guaranteed, that is, if their rights were realized 
at least to a sufficient level. Likewise, I take for granted that a country that 
violates, unprotects and does not guarantee its population´s rights is an 
unjust country. Poverty, abuse, negligence, and violence prevent children 
from enjoying a minimum decent threshold of well-being as children. 
At the same, how a state faces and prevents these problems has a key role 
for children’s well-being and well-becoming. Violations of rights during 
childhood deteriorate and diminish the chances of reaching a minimum 
healthy and decent threshold both in short term and in long term. Thus, 
a society would be fair if the basic capabilities of its citizens were granted 
at least to a threshold that would allow them to live a decent life. As Martha 
Nussbaum states, “the best approach to this idea of a basic social minimum 
is provided by an approach that focuses on human capabilities, that is, what 
people are actually able to do and to be” (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 5).
That being said, something would constitute a problem of social 
justice, and not only a negative event, if it endangers the best way of 
distributing goods and resources in order to minimize threats and guarantee 
equal respect to the (children’s) interest in their well-being and well-
becoming. That is, if it reduces the possibilities of achieving a minimum 
decent threshold. 
In my view, rights —regardless of their legal recognition in concrete 
national constitutions, policies and legal codes— may be interpreted both 
as the content of a theory of justice and as the base of moral obligations 
from an ethical point of view. A theory of justice may generate some specific 
rights and those rights imply obligations to some agents. Even though 
human rights (and children´s rights) may not be directly translated into 
each country’s legal code, human rights are the content of a theory of justice. 
As a crystallization of justice, they generate duties to those states1 that have 
signed those charters (United Nations General Assembly, 1948, 1989). 
As moral rights, as prerogatives or privileges that we recognize to 
some beings for some reasons, human rights are at risk of being interpreted 
as supererogatory moral obligations, which no one is responsible of. 
1 I will use the term state in reference to the main branches of power, namely: governments, 
parliaments and senates, and not in a wide sense including other public institutions and civil society.
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However, in light of these agreements, the realization of children’s rights 
is neither a supererogatory nor an optional duty, but a question of social 
justice that, at least, the powerful branches of the states are responsible of 
as agents of justice. In this sense, they have a key role in the materialization 
of children’s rights.
In what follows I will focus on the situation in western affluent 
countries where a state of welfare is theoretically defended. I will pay special 
attention to child poverty as an instance of injustice in the European Union 
and North America where around 20 per cent of the children live in poor 
households (Adamson, 2012). 
Following what studies on the current situation of children in affluent 
countries reveal, I advocate for the idea that states fail to comply, at least to 
a decent threshold, with their duties toward children’s wellbeing. I will also 
defend, as researches show (Ausín, 2010; Patel, 2012; Ziegler, 2013), that 
the reason why this happens is not a can/ought issue. The lack of effective 
measures and policies to properly realize and protect children’s rights does 
not seem to be caused by a real lack of material resources in a Malthusian 
and Marxian sense. Rather, as those studies suggest, it seems to be a 
question on how states decide to distribute them, what they prioritize, how 
they interpret their duties, and eventually the level of commitment. 
Obviously, one can derive from the right to live a need to invest in 
army and safety measures, or a need to invest in public health systems 
(Dyke, 1970, p. 52). This, in turn, reflects a state´s values and priorities. 
Nevertheless, although states can fulfill their duties through different 
policies, the result should be the same, namely, the solution of the given 
problem of justice. In children´s case, the result should reflect measures to 
warrant social justice toward children and not situations where children´s 
rights are jeopardized and the instances of injustice are perpetuated.
injustice and children: do states really Fail to protect               
children’s rights?
As it has previously been mentioned, the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child affirms that the states have some concrete duties toward 
children´s rights, such as the duty to “undertake all appropriate legislative, 
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administrative, and other measures for the implementation of the rights 
recognized in the present Convention”, or the duty to “undertake measures 
to the maximum extent of their available resources and, where needed, 
within the framework of international co-operation” (Art.4) with respect to 
economic, social and cultural rights. However, this does not seem to happen, 
not even to a minimally decent extent. In fact, it is reasonable to affirm that 
affluent states fail to protect children’s rights and commit to these duties 
at many different levels by leaving the realization of these rights mainly in 
the caregivers and parents’ hands, and by not implementing preventive 
measures providing them with the necessary parental skills, tools and 
means.2 The states’ responsibilities toward children are mainly materialized 
through civil and criminal laws and through institutional interventions in 
severe cases, once the damage is caused or once the parents or care-givers 
have failed to provide children with what they required. In this sense, there 
is still room for preventive measures, investment and new strategies that 
have neither been developed nor accomplished yet.3
One could surely think that the states do not fail to protect 
children´s right to life and well-being, or that the deficit is due to the 
recent economic crisis, for social rights seem harder to protect in times of 
scarcity. Nevertheless, some researches point out that it is more a question 
of priorities and how to distribute a given budget than a question of real 
2 This does not mean that the State should take the parents’ role. It does not intend to suggest that 
there is something unjust in delegating the realization of children´s rights to their parents. Rather, it 
simply tries to point out that although both parents and the States are the main agents of justice for 
children, in fact the burden of the realization of children´s right lies on parents ‘skills and means. 
Thus, if parents lack the economic means and the psychological skills to provide their children 
with their basic needs, a waterfall of negative effects would appear violating so children’s rights. 
Moreover, parental incompetence are frequently the result of the system’s incompetence when it 
comes to deal with child poverty, dysfunctional households, etc. This could be avoided if preventive 
measures and responsibilities toward children’s rights were taking in a more serious way. In this 
sense, there is a lack of awareness and commitment by the states to warrant children’s rights to a 
sufficient threshold in a preventive sense.
3 An example here could be the single-parent households, which frequently are at a greater risk of 
poverty due to female unemployment (Ruggeri & Bird, 2014; United Nations Children´s Fund, 2007). 
If the state effectively assumed a role of agent of justice toward children, parents would be provided 
with the means and resources needed, which actually would be economically more cost-effective (as 
well as less traumatic for the child) than having the child moving from the parent´s household to a 
foster house or to the child-care service.
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material scarcity (Shiva, 2003). In addition, the fact that social rights are 
seen as dispensable is exactly a symptom of the problem of commitment, 
will and motivation that I will address in the following sections. By way of 
example, it seems that it is enough to forbid torture in a country in order 
to realize the right of not being, while it seems that in order to defend a 
right to life or to health a state needs to invest much more. However, this 
is to some extent biased. Both positive and negative rights need efforts and 
investment in order to be guaranteed. It is not enough to forbid a practice, 
but you also have to invest in creating the alternative measures to torture, 
for instance, investing in human and material resources to guarantee fair 
legal procedures.
To provide an example on how states fail to take children´s social 
rights seriously, one could delve into the so-called family cap in the United 
States.4 The fact that a caregiver (normally women) who receives the welfare 
payments for a child in a poor household will not obtain supplementary 
financial support upon the birth of a new child unless the child is the result 
of an involuntary event (rape, incest, and the failure of contraception or 
sterilization) (Joyce et al., 2004; Willis et al., 1997), shows how the main 
concern is not the child. Likewise it shows how it is not a question of lack of 
resources, but a question of values and motivations, for the focus is not the 
children’s rights, but the woman’s sexual and reproductive decisions. 
Another example, especially in times of economic crisis, is the data 
before and after the financial crisis. Firstly, in relation to poverty and 
deprivation, studies show that approximately 15% of the almost 85 million 
children (aged 1 to 16) in 29 European countries lack at least 2 of the 14 items 
in the deprivation index and are therefore “deprived” (Adamson, 2012, p. 
6). Taking the case of Spain5 as an example, as a country specially affected by 
the economic crisis, it is eye-catching how between 2007 and 2013 the figure 
of children who suffer a severe deprivation has increased from 345.000 to 
700.000, that is, from the 4, 4% of children in 2007 to the 8,3 % in 2013 
(Pascual, 2014, p. 27). The case of socially excluded children and adolescent 
from the Romani communities in El Gallinero (Madrid) —when theoretically, 
4 This term refers to the Maximum Family Grant (MFG).
5 I will take in most of the cases Spain as an example of a European country where children’s wellbeing 
has been especially affected by the economic recession.
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also as members of the EU, their basic rights should be provided— can be 
interpreted as another example of a lack of political determination to take 
children’s rights seriously enough (Pitillas & Gómez, 2014).
Recent paradigmatic cases also show how second generation policies 
are sometimes cautiously perceived as somehow supererogatory or extra 
measures closer to charity than to a (truly assumed) duty of justice. Austerity 
measures applied specially in education, and the social care system in Europe 
could be an example. More concretely, the recent rejection by the Spanish 
government to approve a law project (Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales, 
2014, p. 2) against child poverty that would improve the children’s access to 
proper meals is an example of the mentioned lack of commitment toward 
justice for children. Likewise, the denial of the United States to recognize a 
right to food in the United Nations —seeing food mainly as tradable goods— 
is another one (United Nations General Assembly Resolution, 2008) that 
goes directly to the core of the motivational problem. 
Beyond the economic crisis, it may also be beneficial to remember that 
in 2005 8.4 in 10,000 and 120 in 10.000 children were victim of physical and 
emotional abuse in Spain and the US, respectively, so that the victimization 
rate from the US triples the European one (Cantón & Cortés, 2009). With 
respect to physical abuse, 1530 children were killed in 2006 in the US as a 
consequence of intra-family abuse. In order to highlight some important 
figures, it is also crucial the fact that more than 12 children die per year in 
an European country as Spain, victims of maltreatment, and around 20% 
of children under the age of 18 in Europe suffer or have suffered some type 
of sexual abuse (López et al., 1995; Noguerol & Saz, 2002). Epidemiologic 
data also show that 1 in 5 children suffers some kind of bullying (Finkelhor, 
1994) while 1 in 6 children is bullied in Spain (Ortega, 2010). 
Another example is child sex trafficking, which is one of the most 
common types of commercial sexual exploitations. Although many cases 
remain unreported, statistics estimate that around 325000 children in 
North America (Canada, United States and Mexico) are at risk of being 
sexually exploited (Estes & Weiner, 2001, p. 144), as well as 30% of shelter 
youth and 70% of street youth are victims of commercial sexual exploitation 
(Estes & Weiner, 2001, p. 131; Greene et al., 1999, p. 1406). .
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Needless to say, the fact that “many children recruited into 
prostitution in the U.S. and Canada appear to come from middle class 
families and engage in prostitution as methods of supporting themselves 
while living on the nation’s streets” (Estes & Weiner, 2001, p. 3) shows how 
states fail to implement and undertake preventive measures to protect and 
realize children’s rights. 
One might think that a risk 0 situation and the complete elimination of 
criminality is a utopic horizon. However, when the data show how children’s 
maltreatment and death are related to other social problems of the care-
givers,6 and that many negative outcomes could have been easily avoided 
by child-oriented measures, it seems that much more could be done on the 
preventive field (Conger et al., 1992; Coulton et al., 1995). If one is really 
committed to realize the children’s right to life, health, and education, then 
policies to protect and guarantee their rights would be implemented and 
improved —beyond the legal punishment to the offenders once some severe 
damages are already done—, and regardless of the caregivers’ mistakes, as 
mentioned in the family cap example. To phrase it differently, whether a 
state decides to invest a greater budget in developing criminal laws or in 
education and preventive measures to support children is a question of 
values and priorities. Economic decisions are also the result of assumptions, 
beliefs, values and interests. 
However, at this point I would like to make clear that in this article I 
do not try to delve into the question whether children should be prioritized 
against other groups, but I just aim to highlight that they receive less 
attention than they should according to what is already signed on the paper 
and regarding their especial vulnerable condition. In this sense, the claim 
is not that states fail children because they cannot prevent instances of 
crime, but because there is a lack of awareness on how measures designed 
thinking only on adults will eventually affect children in a way that could 
6 Almost 40% of the aggressors in Germany during the period 1985-1990 were chronic alcoholics 
and 50% of families belonging to the register of children social protection services in London 
had problems in relation to the consume of alcohol and other substances. The relation between 
maltreatment and addictions seems to be higher in the United States, occurring in 85% of the 
registered cases in 1999. In Spain around 30% of the registered abusers in the period 1998-1999 
were consuming alcohol and drugs and in the UK around 50% of them had problems in relation to 
alcoholism (Sanmartín, 2008).
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have been avoided if they were considered, as in fact happens in the house 
eviction laws show, just to name an example. 
One might also think that a paternalistic state would not be either 
a solution. However, not being paternalistic toward children leads to 
negligence in relation to the prevention of all the cited situations (Arneson, 
2006). It would be a severe case of blindness if the states ignored how the 
system fail children and how children are much more vulnerable and likely to 
suffer instances of injustice than adults (Mullin, 2014). Children are placed 
in an asymmetric interpersonal dynamic where they do not manage all the 
information; do not make their own decisions about the adults with whom 
they interact, the neighborhood in which they live, etc. In this sense, child 
abuse and exploitation, for instance, is not just an unchangeable side effect 
of modern societies. Rather, it is very often connected —neither necessarily 
nor only— to social exclusion, poverty, and a previous story of neglect and 
violence at home, which leads to cases of running away and leaving the 
household —sometimes, they are even sold by their own families. In these 
cases, prostitution is a way out to survive for them (Altamura, 2014). Thus, if 
the realization of children´s rights were taken seriously by affluent countries, 
the way of approaching these problems would probably be very different. If 
educators were not only trained to identify some of the mentioned problems 
when they arise, but if they were also given the tools to intervene, if more 
means were invested in care-givers’ education and orientation, if social pacts 
in relation to education, children’s household, etc. were achieved, beyond 
economic fluctuations and changes of parties in the governments, then most 
of the cited situations could be avoid or at least reduced.7
Children are in fact a very vulnerable group of citizens, and childhood 
is a sensitive period in relation to the construction of the self. “Children are 
vulnerable because they need care not only to survive but also to develop 
their basic physical, intellectual, and emotional capacities” (Mullin 2014, p. 
266). Just to provide an example, stress during childhood has a modulator 
effect shaping future experience and the construction of the self (Kim et al., 
7 A wide number of studies show how preventive programs that teach parents in risky situations to 
deal with stress, addictions, unemployment and social exclusion have a positive impact on how they 
take care of their children. However, these programs are not systematically protected and performed 
as a necessary part of social care systems (Cantón & Cortés, 2009; VVAA, 2009).
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2013). It is well-known how being constantly under alert makes the cortisol 
increase, which may lead to neurotransmitter disturbances in early phases 
of life compromising the formation of neural circuits. “A series of studies 
spanning 2 decades shows that neglect, abuse, or parenting compromised 
by depression or substance abuse influence the development of the child’s 
brain and biologic pathways” (Odhayani, Watson, & Watson 2013, p. 832) as 
well as it may affect children’s immune systems and the normal functioning 
of biological stress mechanisms (Yoshikawa, Aber, & Beardslee, 2012).
As a result, it is not unreasonable to affirm that western affluent 
states fail, to a greater or lesser extent, to fulfil their acquired duties toward 
children as well as to undertake possible measures. Of course, one might 
think that this can be said in relation to other vulnerable groups, such as 
women, migrants, or the poor. Nevertheless, this article focuses on children 
because they have received less attention in practical philosophy compared 
to women, or non-human animals, and because they are especially 
vulnerable in a qualitatively different way compared to adults.8
when your duties do not motivate you: weakness of will and  
collective responsibility
When an agent has a duty —and recognizes it as such— and does not 
fulfill it, then one is facing a problem of motivation, which is normally 
related to at least one of these problems: a) lack of perception as the main 
agent involved, b) lack of the proper activation, c) lack of recognition in 
your motivational set9 of one of the values involved, d) lack of incentives, e) 
conflict between incompatible aims.
I will briefly analyze the nature of these problems of motivation in 
order to suggest, in the following section, some arguments to untangle them 
and make the ethicists’ discourse more appealing and effective. 
However, before doing so, it might be crucial to address a potential 
conceptual problem, namely, the gap between individual and collective agents. 
8 At the same time, like in many vulnerable groups, two factors could be combined: being a child and 
a girl, being a child and poor, etc.
9 This expression refers to the set of beliefs, wishes, aims, and motives internalized by a moral agent 
(Williams, 1981, pp. 101-113).
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One might find difficult, if not impossible, to consistently relate the 
outcomes from moral psychology to the political sphere or the State as an 
agent of justice, as we deal mainly with collective agents and institutions. 
First of all, I would like to make clear that the aim of this article is not 
to translate the results from moral psychology to collective agents. In fact, 
this is a metaethical article. Rather, my aim is to translate and introduce 
some outcomes from moral psychology (mainly psychology of motivation 
and social psychology) in the practical philosophy discourse, concretely in 
the discourse concerning the realization of children’s rights. Philosophy of 
childhood and theories of social justice for children commonly deal with 
the problem of a gap from what is stated from a long time on the paper and 
the effective realization of the content. In this sense, this article tries to 
explore a path already suggested in other areas, such as the environmental 
ethics, when those ethicists started shifting from catastrophic arguments to 
positive ones based on Hellenistic schools and positive psychology (Velayos, 
2005).10 In a nutshell, the thesis of this article is not to take the lessons from 
moral psychology and show that they can be applied coherently to political 
institutions, but to take those lessons and delve into how they can provide 
new lines of argument to practical philosophers working on childhood —as 
philosophy of childhood has been an underdevelopment topic.
Nevertheless, I would like to make some brief clarifications on that 
topic, as moral psychology is actually aware of the changes in the decision-
making process in relation to individual and collective responsibilities. 
In this regard, there are two different levels in which this can be 
understood, namely, i) how individuals shape their agency depending on 
whether they are acting as part of a group or alone, and, ii) how institutions, 
enterprises, associations, etc., that is, groups or jointed agents, act as a 
qualitatively different moral agent becoming so an individual agent different 
from the sum of the persons in it. This, in fact, leads the moral spectator to 
treat them as an individual agent with moral responsibilities. For both cases, 
moral and social psychology can offer some interesting lines. In both cases 
there will be agents making decisions depending on their values which, in 
turn, are connected to beliefs and aims or, in other words, to a motivation set. 
10 I will come back to this point in next section.
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In relation to the first question (i), the gap between individual 
and collective agents, moral psychology could shed some light to better 
understand how the attribution of responsibilities is shaped and, as a result, 
it could help to increase the commitment to bring to reality what is already 
accepted in the charts. In relation to the second one (ii), understanding 
human motivation will shed some light in understanding not only physical 
persons, but entities, governments, corporations, enterprise, etc., when 
acting as moral agents.
Although the two levels are different, one cannot be analyzed without 
the other one, since that new moral agent is in turn made of individual ones, 
so that a change in how responsibility is perceived by one of those agents 
will change the outcome of the collective agent, and vice versa.
Just to provide an example. A person with a responsibility position 
in a company producing and selling coffee might act and decide slightly 
different when he faces some dilemmas in his private life than when making 
decisions as a member of that collective. Here, moral psychology informs 
us that in group we tend to reduce our empathy toward the others, and be 
more competitive, as I will develop later. However, this person is not totally 
determined. He can change his motivational set, the priorities of his values 
or assume more commitments that were seen as secondary before. This 
will have some consequences and an impact on how the collective agent 
rearranges himself. On the other hand, paying attention now to the second 
level, political philosophy should not ignore that enterprises, companies, 
governments, etc., behave in fact as a moral agent and, what is more, civil 
society treats them as such: not as a group made of many individualities, 
but as an agent. Coming back to the example, if that coffee company 
exploits some environmental valuable areas, or puts their workers in a risky 
situation, the civil society will frequently demand responsibilities as we will 
do with an individual agent, and even if the damage does not constitute a 
violation in legal terms, we will still make moral claims as we would do to 
a person. We would surely say that that company ought us an explanation, 
that company should be ashamed, is guilty of that, is cruel, etc. We do the 
same with governments and countries when we label their decisions and 
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actions as shameful, cruel, coward, brave, right, or wrong.11 The fact that 
1) we attribute them moral emotions and moral conscience as we would do 
with respect to an individual agent, and 2) this company behaves as such 
and will make a decision depending on their aims, priories, and values, 
makes the translation of moral psychology´s outcomes into the public and 
political sphere possible. What is more, this can help to surpass the lack of 
awareness in relation to the feedback between the two mentioned levels. 
Likewise, one might think that this is hard to do as political agents 
are in many cases composed on many individual actors who vote within a 
democratic setup. However, it is precisely the reason why moral and social 
psychology can shed light on the ethical and political question of akrasia 
in public responsibilities and help philosophers to make their arguments 
more appealing. This is exactly the reason why taking into consideration 
how acting alone or in group modifies an agent’s decisions is crucial to 
improve how the duties, agreements and commitments can be brought 
into reality. The worry about the leap from individual actors and political 
actors is in fact what moral psychology could help philosophy to tangle as 
the mentioned problem points out nothing but the role of the discontinuity 
effect between individuals and groups, being this one of the main challenges 
concerning collective responsibilities in realizing justice for children. 
The individual and the collective context are interconnected the 
same way in which the moral and the political one are. In this sense, 
relating moral psychological and practical philosophy can lead us to find 
new synergies and to move some debates forward. Besides, in my view a 
relational perspective on these topics could bring more light. The real world 
lacks clear-cuts, so that, apart from analytic purposes, the assumption of a 
dichotomist cosmovision may lead to an excessive compartmentalization of 
human interpersonal relationships. This, in turn, may lead to forget that 
the public and the private sphere, the moral and the politic questions are 
deeply interconnected, since in the end they all remit to the values a society 
defends, what priorities, beliefs, and fears are internalized, and what aims 
are pursued. Simply said, the map is not the territory. 
11 On this topic some valuable articles are Gilbert (2014), Fieser (1996), List and Pettit (2011), and 
Montuschi´s work (2002).




Justice and Children´s Rights: The Role of Moral Psychology in the Practical Philosophy Discourse
Once these points have been clarified, let´s turn back to the five areas 
—mentioned at the beginning— that practical philosophy could explore to 
find more motivating paths of argumentation:
 a) In relation to responsibility and the materialization of children´s 
rights, it is crucial to highlight how collective responsibilities and omissions 
affect our sense of being responsible of some given results. The sharing of the 
responsibility with respect to damage along with the fact that responsibility 
is perceived as spread among different social agents, not just the states, 
may lead to apathy. The diffusion of responsibility in groups is part of the 
so-called discontinuity effect. It is well known in researches about groups’ 
theories that we cooperate more in individual interactions than in groups 
(Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Insko et al., 1990). The interactions between 
groups are less cooperative and more competitive than the one-to-one 
relations, which imply that there is a rupture between our assumptions when 
interacting with one person and when interacting with a group, especially 
if one perceives himself as part of another group. If you do not cooperate 
and let someone in a bad situation as an individual person, you would feel 
completely responsible of it. However, if this happens and you feel part of 
the group, in this case, a powerful branch of the state, the responsibility will 
be shared with the rest of the members. 
In light of these researches, it seems sensible to suggest that this 
may also have a role when states decide about policies whose beneficiaries 
will be children who do not have the chance to gather in social pressure 
groups and make their voice visible. According to the discontinuity effect, 
a government, as a group, would be more competitive and less open to 
cooperate with those who are considered ‘the others’ and whose interests 
may collapse with their own ones.
Secondly, the lack of motivation and commitment can also be related 
to the fact that the negative consequences emerge from an omission instead 
of an action. The legislative and administrative arms of the states do not 
throw the food away from children´s hands to prevent them from eating. 
Rather, they sign or reject measures that leave children unprotected when 
they are at risky situations, acting sometimes only when the damage is severe 
and already done. As moral psychology’s literature points out (Foot, 1978; 
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Singer, 1972; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008) we feel less responsible of letting 
someone die or suffer than of killing someone or hurting someone directly. 
The classic trolleys experiment lately also show (Mikhail, 2002) how we 
tent to feel more responsible of killing by touching than killing without 
any physical interaction with the victim (by pressing a bottom or by letting 
something happen). Hence, when a state decides to cut down the policies on 
dependency /disability laws, grants, education, or on health-care, without 
being in direct contact with the beneficiaries/victims of those policies, then 
that state´s feeling of responsibility of the negative consequences of their 
decisions decreases. Likewise, the will to improve some given situations 
may decrease. It seems harder to see them as the result of the decisions and 
omissions made in group. 
b) In relation to the proper level of activation, one is not motivated 
when his level of activation is too low or too high. The first case leads to 
apathy and lack of action, the second one to anxiety. This may happen when 
the problem is perceived as too big, complex or unsolvable, which leads to 
overwhelm. The activation of motivation works as an inverted U, so that 
too much activation or too less is paralyzing and not functional in terms of 
results (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). If states think that the problems affecting 
children are not solvable, avoidable or that they could not do better, then 
their motivation will drastically decrease. 
c) The lack of commitment toward these duties can also be treated as 
a type of practical irrationality (Stroud & Tappolet, 2007), concretely as a 
question of akrasia, since the agents do not feel motivated to act in favor of 
what is considered the best option or a duty.
Current moral philosophy has also developed a wide amount of 
research on moral externalism and internalism (Cabezas, 2011). Meanwhile, 
psychology of motivation has provided key explanations on what is involved 
in these cases. In a nutshell, this problem can be approached as a lack of 
convincement, where someone does not feel motivated because s/he has 
not interiorized the rule or value involved (internalism), or, secondly, as 
a lack of motivation itself (externalism), sometimes reduced to a problem 
of emotional interference, since it is common to believe reason has a minor 
role in motivation. However, as Festinger (2001) already pointed out in his 
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theory of cognitive dissonance, and lately also O’Neill (2001) and Gazzaniga 
(1996) did with his experiments on rationalization, humans have a will of 
rationality or coherence (Elster, 1999). Thus, human beings try to rebalance 
the situation searching for coherence when two beliefs, or a belief and an 
action, collapse. Nevertheless, normally it is neither the belief nor the action 
what is changed or reexamined, which would be the rational option. On the 
contrary, agents tent to add premises ad hoc, new exceptions, etc. in order 
to perceive themselves as rational and coherent, without revising, neither 
the initial values, nor the conduct. In fact, if a norm generates judgments 
against our basic intuitions about what would be valid, then we reconsider 
the norm, instead of our intuition (Broncano, 2003, p. 179). If this is applied 
to the current problem on childhood and justice, recognizing and signing 
charters in favor of children’s rights generates duties to the states, which 
would have to realize them. This would collapse with the intuition that it is 
not the states’ responsibility to provide children with tradable goods such as 
food, household, clothes, or preventive programs for the caregivers, etc. In 
this case, states do not check their approach toward material goods needed 
to the realization of what they have defended on those charters, but they add 
premises ad hoc on how to interpret their concrete responsibility toward 
children’s social rights. 
c) A lack of motivation is also related to a lack of internal incentive, 
that is, the duty is perceived as an external one, so that the potential 
incentives one could receive do not connect to the motivational set,12 and, 
as a consequence, the levels of activations diminish, due to the fact that 
external incentives are less motivating than internal ones (De Charm, 1968; 
Deci & Ryan, 1985). 
d) Finally, motivation and actions are affected by the potential 
conflict of interests when different aims seem to be incompatible.13 Shortly 
12 One might think that only individual’s possess motivational set. However, political agents, and 
collective agents such as societies, corporations or governments, to name an example, also possess a 
motivational set as long as they are able to make decisions, for they decide in one direction or another 
depending on their beliefs, values, aims and motives. In other words, any agent able to making 
decision makes them depending on what she thinks of herself, their skills, possibilities, etc., what 
she thinks of the world (also in relation to herself), and what she wants to achieve and avoid, namely: 
beliefs, values, motives and aims.
13 By interests I mean in a general sense whatever goal or aim someone may have in life, both in 
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said, the improvement of children’s well-being will not be a priority as long 
as the measures needed to achieve it are perceived as in conflict with other 
national interests, as an obstacle to get economic benefits, as a waste of 
the state’s budget, or as an unproductive investment. It is therefore crucial 
that states do not perceive an investment in education, food, and health for 
children as a sacrifice or a high cost for themselves. Otherwise, there will be 
a tension between what you perceive as your duties and what you see as good 
for your country, as I will develop in the following section.
some proposals: toward a positive discourse in practical philosophy
The logic of justification is not the logic of motivation. As D. Frede 
affirms, “a morally right action should be done with inclination but not 
because of the inclination” (Frede, 2005, p. 261). However, moral duties 
can be perfectly compatible with personal interests, even if that person in 
this case is formed by a group of persons such as a state. Certainly, national 
governments are formed by moral agents14 and, to that extend, they can 
be considered collective moral subjects influenced by the same factors as 
individuals are.
Probably one of the best ways for a discipline to surpass its own limits 
is to enrich its debates with different and external perspectives. Hence, I 
will suggest in what follows some paths of argumentation and changes of 
strategies that could be applied to solve the four previously mentioned 
challenges on motivation, coming especially from positive and moral 
psychology. The inclusion of these reasoning strategies could benefit the 
impact and reach of political philosophers and ethicists’ discourse on 
childhood as these arguments take also into consideration the motivational 
component of the decision-making process. In this sense, these data 
could be successfully applied to the philosophical discourse concerning 
children’s right’s policies.15 
short-term and long-term.
14 By moral agents I do not mean morally good agents, but agents provided with moral sense. Moral 
here is an antonym of amoral, and not an antonym of immoral.
15 Here it is important to point out that the focus on children does not mean that the realization 
of children’s rights is a higher priority compared to any other group. The question of what group 
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The following are not reasons why children should be protected and 
treated in a fair way, but arguments that may help to realize the commitments 
already assumed at a theoretical level. They are neither focused on a threat 
to a worst scenario, since fear and worry does not keep motivation activated 
for a long period of time. On the contrary, these arguments consider the 
nature of human motivation in favor of ethical ideals. Hence, the aim here 
is finding ways of reaching the ideal horizon starting from how human 
beings seem to be motivated, instead of starting from an ideal construction 
of how we should be.
If practical philosophers want to provide appealing arguments 
to motivate states to realize justice for children and, concretely, if the 
philosophical discourse on rights and duties wants to have a more effective 
and practical impact, then one should find a way, beyond strict moral 
arguments on justification, to avoid the perception of a contradiction 
between personal/partial interests and collective ones. Likewise, the abrupt 
division between moral duties and happiness, or a normative ethics and 
ethics of happiness could be questioned. 
That being said, a potential way to improve philosophical discourses 
and eventually the situation could be, firstly, to translate duties into wills, so 
that they are no longer perceived as intrinsically contradictory. If the results 
from psychology and neuro-linguistic programing (Korzybsky, 1995/1933; 
Yeager & Sommer, 2005) are taken into consideration, a perceived tension 
between an ought and a will is, in practical terms, at some level fictional, 
for it is really the expression of a tension between two different desires, 
commonly short-term and long-term ones. The perceived tension actually 
shows the non-recognition of our own real values, as individuals or 
institutions. In this line, practical philosophers should pay attention to how 
should be prioritized, or even if a conflict between subjects of rights should be solved prioritizing 
a group, is out to the scope on this article. Focusing on one group does not mean to defend that 
their rights are a priority compared to adults, women, or animals. By way of example, a philosopher 
working on environmental ethics does not necessarily assume that ecological problems are a 
priority when compared to gender biases. The election of this field is simply due to the fact that a) 
children are very particular (and challenging) subjects of rights due to their special vulnerability and 
developing autonomy, b) there is still a long way to travel until their rights are implemented and not 
overshadowed by non-context- sensitive policies, and c) philosophy of childhood is a quiet young 
discipline inside practical philosophy (Archard & Macleod, 2002; Bagattini & Macleod, 2014; Graf & 
Schweiger, 2015; Mullin, 2014) that could be enriched by the current proposal.
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the language and the words we use shape the way we interpret reality. As a 
result, it is essential to highlight how every time one says “I ought to but I do 
not want to”, one may be really expressing:
1) A desire exists underneath your ought. If this were the case, the 
tension would become: “I ought to because I want to”.16 For example: 
“I don’t want to recycle but I ought to” could easily be translated it into 
“I want to live in a healthier environment, and as I want to purchase 
that aim” —that I endorse as I want to live in that future situation that I 
perceive as a better option than an intoxicated world—, “I want to do the 
steps needed to achieve it, according to my values”. If philosophers are 
able to highlight this, the perceived tension in oughts and wills in political 
discourses become a case of short-terms and long-term goals. This 
transforms the decision making process into something more positive and 
motivating than the idea of starting a conflict between desires and oughts 
and sacrifices, if that aim is coherent to our values:17 “I ought to recycle 
because I want to live in a healthier planet”. The motivation lies in the 
ultimate goal (a healthier environment, being thin, etc.) more than in the 
steps in between (classify your waste, doing a diet, etc.). For this reason, it 
is essential not to forget the connection between those steps and the final 
goal in the discourse in favor of political measures for children’s rights. 
To phrase it differently: the positive benefits of policies —for both, the 
state and the direct beneficiaries— will be visible in time. In order to keep 
the motivation activated in public collective challenges where the result 
is not immediate, philosophical discourse should therefore keep in mind 
the importance of the impact of the little actions or policies avoiding so 
feelings of apathy, fear, or frustration in the discourse.
2) A desire does not exist underneath your ought. If this were the 
case, the tension would become harder: “I think that I ought to, but I do not 
want to”. In these cases the agents (of justice) are expressing that they do 
not feel committed to either the long-term duty or the means to achieve it. 
If someone expresses “I must recycle but I do not want to”, this may mean 
in this second case not only that you do not feel like investing your time 
16 This because does not imply a reason in terms of justification. That is not the reason why duties are 
justified, but a reason in terms of motivation.
17 If that is not the case, we will be in option 2).
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in selecting your organic and plastic waste, but that you do not really want, 
care or are concerned about living in a better or healthier environment. 
This means that the tension is fictional for that agent, for s/he does not 
really recognize an ought there, so that that ought is not interiorized, it 
does not represent a value for that person or, in Williams’ terms (1981), it 
is not part of his/her motivational set. As long as an ought is external, its 
motivating force is weak. The same may happen concerning states’ duties 
toward children’s rights. One may be reacting here to external or social 
expectations. However, decisions based on this kind of duty will not be kept 
in time.
In those cases, philosophers should not forget in their discourse that 
beliefs provide us strong theses, and values work as criteria guiding not only 
our motivation, but also our decision-making process. For these reasons, 
philosophers should find different ways to give appealing discourses to 
those responsible agents who seem to be disconnected from their acquired 
duties. Possibly, as in other dichotomic pairs, practical philosophy has 
ignored that oughts are linked to a negative demotivating connotation. In 
fact, we generally associate I have to, I ought to or I must to actions that are 
hard to do or not very attractive, which explains why it seems hard to make 
them compatible with motivation and the ethics of happiness. We say “I 
ought to do the housework” or “I ought to go to the bank”, but we never find 
ourselves saying “I have to have a nice afternoon in the swimming-pool” 
or “I ought to go to a party”, unless we really hate swimming-pools, we do 
not actually want to go to that party, or we are workaholics who really do not 
want to do so.
In order to avoid this, and especially in light of positive psychology 
and NLP,18 it would be efficient to avoid negative arguments appealing to fear 
or catastrophic consequences given that fear, punishment and threats do 
not motivate in long-term, but paralyze the agent. They have a great impact, 
but only during a short period of time (you cannot be always afraid) and in 
an inefficient sense (if you think the situation is catastrophic you may end 
up feeling helplessness and overwhelm). To provide an example: If we are 
deciding whether or not to smoke, the effect on our perception, motivation 
18 NLP stands for Neuro-Linguistic Programming.
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and decision-making process is different if we think “I don’t want to have 
a lung cancer or arteriosclerosis”, “I don’t want to have a heart attack” or if 
we think “I want to be able to run, and hick without feeling that I lack some 
air, I want to feel better, I want to live longer”. Needless to say, this applies 
to public debates where catastrophic and negative images are frequently 
brought into our minds whenever duties, short-term commitments and 
long-terms consequences are addressed.
Environmental ethics have been an example in this direction (Velayos, 
2005). Appealing mainly to the end of the word, saying that the chances of 
having a cancer are increasing or that the planet would be inhabitable in 100 
years’ time makes you feel that you cannot do anything, and that whatever 
you do in the right direction is useless. However, appealing to the idea that 
you could be happier and live longer in a more respectful environment 
could motivate agents to do lasting changes toward what they want instead 
of trying to motivate them to make changes to avoid what they do not what. 
Therapies for sexual abusers are another example. If you try to convince 
the abuser about the morally wrongness of his actions, the argument will 
not be interiorized because in order to do so, first you have to feel some 
kind of concern and empathy for the victim´s suffering. If that is irrelevant 
to the abuser, knowing the negative consequences of his actions will not 
change his motivational set at all. It is more effective, on the contrary, if 
the argument focuses on what they are missing, i.e., the chance to have 
consented relationships. That connects directly to the agent’s benefits 
and interests. When the abusers are said that they are missing the chance 
to have better experiences, then the curiosity of having missed something 
is activated. Although this may lead to respect others’ rights not for the 
morally right reasons, the change of attitude is relevant and the first step to 
get a change in the ethical direction.
If this is applied to children’s rights, the philosophical discourse on 
their materialization should try to show it as a win-win process, avoiding 
those perspectives that see the realization of rights as a loss of privileges 
by some groups. In this sense, it would be effective to also include in the 
ethical discourse how states are missing the chance to have successful 
generations of children with a good education that could generate diverse 
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kinds of richness to their country: intellectual, artistic, economic, and 
scientific, for instance.
The win-win model —a theory of games and negotiation— is taken 
here as an example of ethical interactions where the solution/action/
decision has to be perceived as good for and by all the agents involved 
and affected by it, as a filter to identify bad and unfair agreements. In this 
case, philosophy can apply it between governments and civil society, or 
governments and children, as a model for previous negotiations, before the 
damage is done. It could surely be seen as a practical and positive version 
of the Rawlsian veil of ignorance in which the motivation is not the fear of 
being in a disadvantage position, but the knowledge that whatever decision 
taken that implies hurting someone else’s wellbeing is unfair and will end 
up damaging your own interests too. As banal as it might seem, history is 
however full of instances in this direction: the guillotined French king 
Louis XVI or the tragic end of the Russian Romanov family could be just 
two examples. For this reason, win-win type negotiations and interactions 
seem to be the most effective ones in long-terms in comparison to the 
other three possibilities; which I am not alone in recognising: “broadening 
and building —that is growth and positive development— are the essential 
characteristics of a win-win encounter” (Seligman, 2004, p. 43). In a 
nutshell, the argument is: if it is not good for the other one, it cannot be 
good for me. If in the negotiation of any agreement, measures, policies, etc. 
only one of the parts wins, it means we are facing a kind of abuse that will 
surely imply some damage to the most vulnerable part, and eventually to 
the whole. This type of negotiations helps us to identify damages. Hence, 
a lose-lose type of thinking could be find in suicidal terrorists, a win-lose 
one in asymmetric relations such as slavery, a lose-win type of thought 
would be the one when the subject puts herself in the place of the victim 
in favor of someone else’s interests, and a win-win type of interaction 
would be the one where what is fundamental for both sides is respected in 
the final solution (Seligman, 2004).19 Hence, practical philosopher could 
19 The win-win model does not imply that criminals should not be punished, for instead, but that 
before the damage is done they should be able to see how choosing a win-lose type of interaction 
will imply negative consequences also for them in the future (i.e., going to jail and not being able to 
pursuit a better life). Another question is whether we justify some moral damages (as one might do 
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enrich their arguments showing how the realization of children’s rights is 
cost-effective and positive also for those agents of justice who might firstly 
perceive it as an effort or a sacrifice with no visible benefits (lose-win). A 
way for practical philosophers to make their arguments more motivating 
is therefore to make the main agent of justice sees that those measures are 
not a duty with negative impact on their budget and interests, but that being 
a just state also benefits them in the short and long-term. A society with 
healthy, educated and autonomous children would surely be better than 
a society full of children suffering several types of traumatization, social 
exclusion and deprivations, also in economic terms, and in order to keep 
a welfare state. 
One could also say that the states have a duty toward children, even 
though they see it as a win-lose interaction, even if it implies some sacrifices 
to the states. As true as this might be in the logic of justification and from 
an strictly ethical point of view, one might not forget that accepting great 
costs to your own interests would turn the responsibility of cooperating in a 
social problem of justice into a form of self-sacrifice and altruism, which is 
not the desired aim here in terms of justice. I do not take into consideration 
the case of altruism here, but the motivation in cooperation, for the aim is 
to find arguments not to make states altruistic, but to make them commit 
to policies of social justice. In order to do so, a path could be to give them 
arguments to perceive these policies not as a threat, but as a positive 
measure also for their own particular interests. Likewise, altruism implies 
an additional ingredient in comparison to prosocial behaviours, since the 
agent is focused on the other’s needs, expects to improve someone else’s 
well-being and does not expect anything in return, which is not the cases of 
affluent states. For this reason, the I lose, you win type of interaction is not 
efficient in the public sphere, for it implies sacrifices than one may not be 
willing to assume.
In light of positive psychology and the win-win model, one could 
analyze the cited position of the United States against the recognition of 
food as a right and not only as a tradable product, which of course affects the 
realization of children’s social rights. The question here is why someone 
sometimes concerning punishments).
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would deny the right to eat to someone else. What could someone be afraid 
to lose in order to come to the conclusion that it is better to deny that food is 
a basic need? What could be the reasons behind the thesis that food should 
not be recognized as an essential part of the right to live? The answers to 
these questions would lead us to the core of the problem and eventually to 
other ways of arguing.
From the win-win model, it seems clear that the United States 
perceived such a resolution as an I lose, you win one. One of the main 
reasons may be a fear of negative economic consequences. If food is the 
source of one of the greatest incomes and it is only seen as the key element 
of an industry, then it is understandable that transforming it into public 
goods, and not only tradable products, can generate some fears. As it has 
previously been said, no one is normally willing to defend a measure that 
is perceived as against his own interests. And practical philosophy should 
not ignore this. If philosophy could also take into account the motivational 
elements of the arguments, it would be easier to reach to the core of many of 
our current disagreements and, eventually, to generate new arguments that 
would motivate and be more effective than the ones one could provide when 
one ignores what really motivates those with diverging points of views. 
In the mentioned example, one could argue in favour of the right to food 
from a win-win perspective, pointing out how public education and public 
libraries are not perceived as a threat to the editorial industry. Actually 
the editorial industry will be eventually nurtured by and from those who, 
thanks to having a public education and public libraries, are able to read 
and write and become passionate readers who eventually become clients of 
the editorial industry, not only buying books, but asking in their libraries 
for new titles, creating so a demand. Thus, part of the arguments to reverse 
the way states think about food only as tradable goods should address the 
question on how to make the food industry compatible with the realization 
of the right to eat, for instance. 
As a result, it is central to change the negative way in which the 
investment in social policies is perceived, almost as a sacrifice against 
other —economic- interests. By changing the thought behind that emotion 
(of fear), the course of action would also be modified. In other words, our 




María del Mar Cabezas
thoughts, assumptions, beliefs, etc., generate some emotions and our 
emotions have an influence in the decisions we are prompted to make and 
eventually in our actions. If practical philosophers were able to untangle 
the beliefs underneath those fears, we would increase the possibilities to 
change the negative consequences emerging from those policies (i.e. the 
denial of measure in favour of children social rights). As it has been said, 
the problem of the realization of children’s right leads to a problem of fear, 
for those measures are perceived as associated to losing economic benefits. 
When someone -a person, a group or a government- is afraid, it means that 
this agent has evaluated something as a dangerous input, as a risk to her 
well-being or her aims bigger than her skills to overcome it (Ekman, 1994). 
Being aware of the thoughts that shape our motivational set eases finding 
different perspectives. 
Ultimately, one of the background challenges is to minimize the 
discontinuity effect between individuals and groups. Humans are ready 
to help and take some action if they think that the situation is changeable, 
their action is going to be useful and beneficial and not a waste of energy 
and time, and if they think that the investment they have to do will not 
imply great negative costs to them. If the agents of justice think that the 
problem is not solvable or that the solution is not in their hands, they 
could easily end up facing a case of learnt helplessness, which keep the 
agents in apathy (Seligman, 2004, p. 12). For this reason, it is crucial to 
also focus on what we could achieve, and not only on what is wrong. “A 
positive mood jolts us into an entirely different way of thinking from a 
negative mood” (Seligman, 2004, p. 38) and this applies also to states 
deciding what measures to develop.
conclusion
In conclusion, all these proposals suggest the potential benefits of 
exploring the nature of motivation in relation to moral justifications in 
ethical and political philosophy to better translate theoretical achievement 
into practical goals. Likewise the conjunction of ethical theses shaped by 
motivational arguments could break the boundary between the ethics of 
happiness and deontology.
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Paying attention to the motivation underneath public decisions would 
give us the opportunity to recognize our common aims and public values 
and would eventually help achieve a better communication with the agents 
defending a divergent point of view, which is crucial in the public arena. In 
doing so, practical philosophy could help check our collective beliefs, and 
eventually make better decisions surpassing akrasia, focusing so on what 
is important to us as a society in public debates concerning justice, and 
children´s rights.
Finally, practical philosophers could benefit from interdisciplinary 
research as I have tried to present here. In this sense I have shown how 
practical philosophy has the opportunity to improve our public debates 
reducing the tensions and profiting the results from others fields, 
concretely in the cases of justice for children. In doing so, philosophical 
discourse could turn out to be more influential and appealing fulfilling also 
its social role.
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